Oportunistik Incumbent dalam Penganggaran Pendapatan dan Belanja pada Pemilihan Kepala Daerah Serentak Tahun 2017
Abstract
This study aims to examine the effects of incumbent opportunistic behavior on budget compilation related to the simultaneous election of regional heads (pemilukada) in regencies, cities, and provinces in Indonesia in 2017. In addition, the study also examines differences in incumbent opportunistic behavior when preparing budgets for elected incumbent heads compared with those who did not get elected as well as differences in incumbent opportunistic behavior a year prior to and during the simultaneous elections. The research population comprises all regencies, cities, and provinces in Indonesia. The sampling method used for this study was purposive sampling. Data were analyzed using multiple linear regression and different types of t-Tests. The results of the analysis showed that PAD and SiLPA had an effect on the incumbent opportunism behavior and DAK had no effect on incumbent opportunism behavior. The results of different t-Tests revealed differences in incumbent opportunistic behaviors of winners and losers as well as differences in incumbent opportunistic behavior in the budgeting year prior to and during the post-conflict simultaneous local elections held in 2017.
Keywords: incumbent opportunistic behavior, post-conflict local elections, regional income and expenditure budget.
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