ABSTRACT

In the past decade, the Indonesian government has taken political and economic policy measures to improve the country’s image as a Muslim-friendly destination. The leading destinations chosen to be developed with the concept of sharia tourism are one form of these efforts. However, the policy faced negative responses from several regions, especially from tourism stakeholders in Bali. Indeed, the Balinese are not enthusiastic about the possibility of their island being labelled as sharia tourism destination. Even though sharia tourism stakeholders took the initiative to show the potential benefits of sharia tourism economically, the idea was still rejected. Primary data was collected utilizing in - depth interviews with key informants selected purposively, while secondary data was obtained from literature, documents, information from mass media and local television. The data were analyzed with a critical theory approach in the style of cultural studies, using the theory of hegemony, ideology, power/knowledge relations and critical discourse analysis to explain the form of discourse, response forms and implications of the discourse on sharia tourism development in Bali. This paper also presents both empirical and theoretical findings and provides recommendations. This article concludes that Bali can't be transformed into a sharia tourism destination, however, Bali still accommodates the needs of Muslim tourists.

Keywords: discourse, sharia tourism, Balinese cultural tourism, hegemony, counter-hegemony

INTRODUCTION

The discourse of implementing sharia tourism in Bali has raised pros and cons among Bali’s tourism stakeholders, the Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy (Kemenparekraf) as well as sharia economic stakeholders. The Balinese side rejected the policy while the
sharia tourism stakeholders were in line with the government's wishes. The development of sharia tourism destination is motivated by the economic potential of the halal lifestyle (Marbun, 2018; Rabo & Isaac, 2019: 151; KNEKS, 2020), the growth of the halal market and global Muslim population (Pewforum, 2011), as well as Indonesia's position as the country with the largest Muslim population. It should be noted that the development of the halal lifestyle industry is guided by the legal system and the sharia economic system (KNEKS, 2020). The halal lifestyle industry includes clusters in the fields of pharmacy, cosmetics, fashion, media, recreation, halal food, and sharia tourism (Razalli et al., 2012: 92; Kompas, 2020; KNEKS, 2020). The implementation of sharia principles in sharia tourism clusters is classy and added value, considering that Islamic tourists can continue to maintain their religiosity and personal attachment to the divine in their daily life and during their trip (Ma'zumi et al., 2017: 279). According to KNEKS, Indonesia has the potential to become a World Halal Center, by encouraging sharia tourism clusters as a locomotive for economic growth by networking with OIC member countries following the sophistication provided by globalization (Appadurai, 1990: 295-310).

In addition to the capital of the Muslim population, Indonesia also has an umbrella in the form of power technology devices (Foucault in Behrent, 2013), namely Islamic sharia-based regulations, including marriage laws, banking, sharia finance, waqf, zakat management, (anti) pornography, guarantee of halal products and services, implementation of the field of halal product assurance, ministerial regulations regarding guidelines for the implementation of sharia hotels, guidelines for the implementation of sharia tourism by National Sharia Council-Indonesian Ulema Council or Dewan Syariah Nasional-Majelis Ulama Indonesia (DSN-MUI Fatwa No. 108 of 2016) and KNEKS as a non-structural institution that has a master plan in enhancing the development of the national sharia economic and financial ecosystem. It is important to note that the Indonesian sharia tourism cluster has been active and received recognition from the World Halal Tourism Award in the form of three awards in 2015 and twelve awards in 2016. The awards include the halal tourism business in the fields of airlines, airports, family-friendly hotels, resorts, halal travel operators, halal travel websites, halal honeymoon destinations, hajj and umrah operators, halal destinations, halal culinary destinations and halal cultural destinations (GMTI, 2016; Kemenparekraf, 2016; Marbun, 2018). Furthermore, Indonesia's halal tourism ranking has also increased in the last 5 years, ranking 6 in 2015, ranking 4 in 2016, and ranking 1 in 2019.
This achievement shows that Indonesia has the potential to become "one of the main actors and hubs of the world's sharia economy" (KNEKS).

The Ministry of Tourism and Creative Economy identified thirteen provinces, starting from West Nusa Tenggara, Nangroe Aceh Darussalam, West Sumatra, Riau, Lampung, Banten, DKI Jakarta, West Java, Central Java, Yogyakarta, East Java, South Sulawesi, and Bali, as sharia tourism destinations (Andriani, et al., 2015; Sindo News, 2015; Al Hasan, 2017), based on the readiness and availability of sharia hotel accommodation, halal restaurants (JPNN, 2015b; Kumparan, 2019; Republika, 2013), houses of worship, and etc.

The role of the island of Bali in the development of sharia-labeled destinations is seen as potential, considering that culture, traditional traditions, religious rituals, and nature are attractive. There is no doubt that in Bali there are 760 mosques, dozens of Islamic banking, halal restaurants, sharia hotels, hundreds of halal-certified producers. It is very important to add that social life in Bali is conducive to cultural diversity, as evidenced by the high index of religious harmony (Ministry of Religion, 2019; Republika, 2017; Tribun Bali, 2019), in Bali there are also traditional villages with a majority Muslim population such as Pegayaman Village, Gelgel Village, Loloan Village, which located outside the tourism track, namely in North Bali and West Bali. Certainly, Muslim tourists do not worry about traveling to Bali. Therefore, it makes sense that Bali is included in the list of sharia tourism destinations issued by the tourism ministry (Andriani et al., 2015; Sindo News, 2015; Al Hasan, 2017).

However, the discourse on developing sharia tourism destination faced a rejection response from the Balinese side, when the Islamic Economic Community (MES) Bali made a statement, quoted by mass media, had a discourse on fostering a Muslim-majority village in Bali as a "pilot project for sharia economic development" (Metro Bali, 2015b), and working on a sharia tourism village. in Bali (Republika, 2015), as a pilot village for the application of sharia values in a kaffah manner, as an actualization of Islam that is rahmatan lil alamin (Hermawan, interviewed 16 May 2019). At least eight demonstrations took place in East Bali, West Bali and South Bali such as in Karangasem (Tribun Bali, 2015g), in Klungkung (Tribun Bali, 2015c), (Nusa Bali, 2015), and Denpasar (Layarberita, 2015), (Nusa Bali, 2015), in Tabanan (News.beritabali.com, 2015c), in Gianyar (Nusa Bali, 2015), in Buleleng (Metro Bali, 2015a), (Tribun Bali, 2015e), (Kabarnusa, 2015a), and in Jembrana (Tribun Bali, 2015b), (Liputan6, 2015), (Kabarnusa, 2015a,b), to reject the discourse of sharia tourism village. The participants in the action consisted of youth groups, students, members of community...
organizations such as the “Puskor Hindunesia”, “Aliansi Peduli Bali” (the Bali Care Alliance), “Aliansi Hindu Muda Indonesia” (the Young Indonesian Hindu Alliance), “Kesatuan Mahasiswa Hindu Dharma Indonesia” (the Indonesian Hindu Dharma Student Union), “Kelompok Cakrawayu” (the Cakrawayu Group), and “Gerakan Pemuda Marhaen” (the Marhaen Youth Movement). Rejection was also conveyed by the governor of Bali (2013-2018) (Republika, 2015b; JPNN, 2015b), Members of the DPD RI (Tribun Bali, 2015a), Deputy Chairperson of the Provincial DPRD of Bali (Tribun Bali, 2015a), Chairperson of the Bali Indonesian Hotel and Restaurant Association (PHRI) (Liputan6, 2015). The resistance again occurred when the vice presidential candidate Sandiaga Uno in 2019 conveyed a discourse on the development of sharia tourism destinations while campaigning in Bali (Media Indonesia, 2019). The refusal was conveyed by the Governor of Bali (2018-2024) (Detik News, 2019), the Deputy Governor of Bali (2018-2024) (Media Indonesia, 2019), humanists, traditional leaders, community leaders (Media Indonesia, 2019; Detik News, 2019e).

Despite the pros and cons, the sharia tourism business, sharia hotels, halal restaurants in Bali continue to develop sustainably. In 2015 there were the Bayt Kaboki hotel (JPNN, 2015a) and the Rhadana hotel in Kuta, comparing to 2020, the number of halal-certified hotel restaurants rose to eleven units (LPPOM MUI Bali, 2020). Therefore, the polemic of sharia tourism destination in Bali is relevant to be studied with a cross-disciplinary approach in the cultural studies method.

METHOD

In addition, to analyzing the situation related to tourism in Bali and Indonesia in general, special attention is focused on sharia tourism discourse to understand the form of sharia tourism development discourse in Bali, knowing the response to it and its implications. The answer to this question will reflect the attitude of officials, the attitude of the local community and the attitude of the stakeholders towards the perspective that wants to make the island of Bali a leading destination with a halal label. Research questions will be answered using a two-pronged qualitative method. First, collecting primary data through in-depth interviews with key informants determined by purposive sampling technique. It should be noted, that the in-depth interview technique involves a series of prepared questions, however, this technique provides flexibility so that it can be developed to ensure that the interviewed informants will provide in-depth insight into the issues of sharia tourism development.
discourse in Bali. In addition, secondary data was also collected through literature and documents review, media information and local television program. Secondary data was collected as a cross-reference of research results. Overall, both primary and secondary data were analyzed using hegemonic theory, ideological theory, power/knowledge relation theory and critical discourse analysis which were used eclectically. Furthermore, the results of the analysis are compiled based on the common thread from the results of interviews and literature reviews.

RESULT AND DISCUSSIONS

The development of sharia tourism destinations in Indonesia is an integral part of the national economic policy promoted by the government based on Islamic sharia. The legal, economic and financial principles sourced from the Holy Qur'an are implemented into state policy through the process of positivizing the Islamic legal system into the national legal system, economic system and national financial system as represented in the law on Islamic justice, marriage, sharia finance, (anti) pornography, halal product guarantees, ministerial regulations regarding guidelines for operating sharia hotel businesses, as well as guidelines for tourism implementation based on sharia principles in the form of a DSN-MUI Fatwa. The ideology of Islamic economics and finance (Marbun, 2018) is accommodated by the state in order to strengthen national economic resilience, and to make Indonesia a leading Islamic economic center in the world. In order to accelerate the growth of sharia economy, the government formed the National Committee for Sharia Economy and Finance (Komite Nasional Ekonomi dan Keuangan Syariah or KNEKS). Furthermore, KNEKS makes the sharia tourism cluster as one of the main sectors to strengthening the halal value chain. Accordingly, sharia tourism is applied nationally, including in Bali. Thus, the political policy of sharia economic and financial development and the positivization of the sharia legal system can be seen as an effort to create distinction in order to maintain class and dominance of sharia economic stakeholder groups (Marbun, 2021). Likewise, the top-down approach in development sharia tourism destination policy in Bali can be interpreted as a practice of state hegemony towards Bali (Marbun, 2021), by socializing the ideology and identity of the majority group to produce a consensus, so that the concept and label of sharia tourism can be accepted and implemented in Bali.
The hegemony of the state, that proposed to develop sharia tourism in Bali has faced a counter-hegemonic response from the cultural tourism stakeholders and components of the Balinese Hindu community. The counter-hegemony response was delivered (1) on a regulatif basis, in the form of updating regional regulations on Balinese cultural tourism and the making of new regulations related to maintaining Balinese ethnic and cultural identity, such as using Balinese language and clothing on certain days for civil servants and private; as well as counter hegemony (2) directly submitted to Kemenparekraf officials, to management of community organizations, and to the vice presidential candidates who are campaigning in Bali. The counter-hegemony response was motivated by (1) the concept of Balinese cultural tourism which has developed and has been regulated since the 1970s, (2) the actualization of the values of multiculturalism in the practice of Balinese cultural tourism which is characterized by the spirit of togetherness and freedom without discrimination, (3) is motivated by Islamophobic discourses such as prejudice and stereotypes against Muslims as immigrants, and (4) efforts to maintain ethnic identity imbued with the steady spirit of Bali. Due to the counter-hegemony response, both regulatory and practical, the hegemony of sharia tourism development never run smoothly and unanimously in Bali, as well as in other areas such in Labuan Bajo, East Nusa Tenggara and Toba, North Sumatra, which have the majority population were not share the same belief with the stakeholders of sharia tourism. The counter-hegemony response from tourism stakeholders in Bali emphasized that Balinese people refuse to be labeled as sharia tourism destination because the label can be interpreted as a form of violence against the local traditions, identity and establishment of cultural tourism in Bali (Marbun, 2021). However, it should be underlined, that Bali remains committed to practicing hospitality to all tourists, including accommodating the spiritual needs of Muslim tourists (Marbun, 2021), such prepared in hotel room facilities compliance to sharia, halal culinary, etc. Thus, the practice of counter hegemony that occurs can be interpreted that state policies that use a top-down approach are irrelevant in the current era of globalization.

The implications of the discourse on developing sharia tourism in Bali are (1) the discourse on identity politics is getting stronger because the state has made political policies that accommodate the sharia legal system and sharia economic system into the national legal system so that it opens up space for identity struggles between groups (Marbun, 2021), (2) government policies which identifies and includes Bali as one of the sharia tourism destinations can be interpreted as a form of political dominance and a threat to the
sustainability of cultural tourism, preservation of ethnic identity, marginalization of Hindu religious values in Bali (Marbun, 2021), (3) the sense of threat contributes to increasing public awareness so that Bali can implement a Balinese governance system, one management system, which is outlined among others through regional regulations on standards for managing Balinese cultural tourism, strengthening traditional villages, preserving Balinese language and clothing. Efforts towards self-reliance in Bali have become a necessity in order to control the impact of capitalization, exploitation of culture, traditions, customs and natural resources in the name of national tourism economic development policies, (4) the discourse of sharia tourism development in Bali opens up space for capitalization, both for those who are pro and those who are against the discourse of sharia tourism. Stakeholders who are against the discourse of sharia tourism development that are reaping blessings are (a) populist politicians who are increasingly popular in the community by utilizing the issue of sharia tourism development discourse as a political commodity in order to win constituent support, and (b) other ethnicities can make this practice counter hegemony to the discourse of sharia tourism development in Bali, as a reference. Meanwhile, stakeholders who are pro to the discourse of developing sharia tourism at the national level can freely continue the implementation of the concept of sharia tourism in at least 10 other provinces outside Bali, as well as stakeholders who are pro to the development of sharia tourism in Bali can continue their business after receiving clear signs post counter hegemony (Marbun, 2021). Based on these implications, it can be said that the attraction of interest between the two parties has reached a stable position, where Balinese cultural tourism remains as an icon of Bali tourism, while on the other hand the practice of sharia tourism can continue to process.

CONCLUSION

Stakeholders of the sharia legal system, sharia economic and financial system, as well as the halal lifestyle industry in Indonesia have succeeded in constructing power technology, sharia-based governmentality technology that is accommodated into the national legal system and national economic system through legal political policies and national economic politics. The sharia-based legal product has been implemented as a legal umbrella for economic development, sharia finance, including the umbrella practice for developing sharia tourism clusters. Thus, it can be said that Michel Foucault's theory of the relation of power and knowledge, technology of power, technology of governmentality, technology of
self; find the context. The state and stakeholders in the development of sharia tourism clusters have not succeeded in realizing their hegemony to Bali, even though these hegemony efforts have been in progress both explicitly and implicitly since 2013-2019. The counter hegemony from the Balinese side to the hegemony of sharia tourism development is carried out for two strong reasons, namely regulatory reasons and practical reasons. The hegemony and counter hegemony of sharia tourism in Bali in 2013-2019, theoretically shows that there is no total hegemony (Marbun, 2021) as is generally understood from the hegemony theory of Antonio Gramsci and his followers. The concept of sharia tourism has always faced consistent resistance from the Balinese in the last decade, which can be used as a theoretical basis to predict that the counter hegemony movement towards sharia tourism concepts and labels will continue whenever sharia tourism issues emerge in the public domain (Marbun, 2021).

Therefore, the discourse of sharia tourism development triggers polemic, hegemony, counter hegemony and has counter-productive implications. It is very important to note that although Bali does not implement the label of sharia tourism, halal tourism, Muslim friendly, Bali still practices the values of multiculturalism, applying hospitality to all tourists, including accommodating the spiritual needs of Muslim tourists. Therefore, it is recommended that the government avoid conflicts of interest and provide support for efforts to maintain the identity and icon of Balinese cultural tourism. Meanwhile, the local government of Bali is advised to expose the practice of harmony, Balinese hospitality in order to strengthen the brand image of Balinese cultural tourism. Meanwhile, the community is advised to maintain togetherness, mutual respect in the spirit of Bhinneka Tunggal Ika. Finally, further researchers are advised to conduct replication research with different contexts, cultures, and locations by considering the possibility of using mixed methods, focus group discussion techniques, and adding relevant research variables.

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