PARADISE LOST, SANITY GAINED: TOWARDS A CRITICAL BALINESE URBANISM

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Abstract

Bali is a global tourist destination having had the added descriptor paradise for most of the last century. But it is now transparent to most visitors that serious problems prevail across the entire local economy and built environment. The incoherence of development is largely to blame. Given the failure to generate a new Balinese architecture that matches the integrity of the old, Balinese urbanists are now caught in a Gordian knot where a unified traditional architecture remains, yet a new architecture is not forthcoming. How to untie the knot is the question. Architecture suffered major discontinuity when traditional building was largely abandoned in the face of progressive urbanization. The problem remains unresolved. The following paper represents a preliminary attempt to expose key issues. It suggests methods of moving forward. But a new momentum demands a new philosophy in the realm of urban theory, the foundation of all professional activity. No significant progress can take place without it. My attention is therefore directed to answering the question how can the transition be made from traditional Balinese architecture emerging from the dynamics of feudalism, to its conscious translation and accommodation within post-modernity, informational capitalism, and globalization? While the problem needs tackled at several levels – education, policy, strategy and enforcement, I suggest in conclusion that these should be framed within generic principles derived from vernacular transformations, a culture of critical Balinese regionalism, and an adaptation of the New Urbanist lexicon to a tropical environment.

Key Words: *Paradise, culture, globalization, corruption, vernacular, the New Urbanism*

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The fact remains that 'urban culture' is as it is presented, is neither a concept nor a theory. It is strictly speaking, a myth, since it recounts, ideologically, the history of the human species.

Manuel Castells

Introduction

The dominant paradigm internationally is that Bali is a paradise island. Locally things are different. There is much support for the idea that tourist development is destroying the landscape, culture and traditions of this beautiful place. As the enduring myth of paradise is perpetuated, Bali's urban environment is fast becoming a disaster zone. Such views are so ubiquitous and engrained that they are generally accepted as axiomatic. It is clear that lack of adequate finance, mismanagement of the urban realm and corruption are largely responsible. Even assuming these issues were satisfied, how is coherence in the urban realm to be established? Here, the academy, professions, and state agencies have collectively failed to stimulate a meaningful debate on policy, urban design strategy and design control. Much of this is due to the fact that no serious commentary on the urban environment of Bali exists, and the voice of architecture is constrained to coffee table books for tourists in Periplus bookstores. Moving forward, there are even more serious limits to debate. Problematically and with rare exceptions, anthropological, historical and cultural perspectives infuse the literature on Bali. Most ignore development, the political process, and the tsunami of globalization. So meaningful studies of the urban process involving the daily life of four million people are sacrificed to somewhat utopian and essentialist studies of tradition dominated by perspectives from art and culture. Infinitely rarer is the text that addresses urbanisation in any depth. Hence the built environment inhabited by four million people is neither subject to substantial critique nor in possession of a general guiding philosophy. Taken together, the idea of a paradise island and a widespread acceptance of

a parasitic relationship between tourism, environment, culture and economic development, distorts the *actuality* of social life.

Unfortunately the idea that there are solutions to the problematic of culture is false consciousness. There can be no answer to the 'problems' of culture on the assumption that culture should in some way be different from its prevailing manifestations. Similarly, there are no *solutions* to problems of development. Development is an evolutionary process where problems and solutions are bonded together in a continuous state of flux. So culture and development can never be 'solved' since capitalism itself contains inherent structural contradictions such as social class, control over the state, and distorted communication, just to begin. Such conflicts deny the utopian idea that at some point Bali will reach a state of perfect equilibrium, or indeed that new problems will not replace the old. This does not mean however that a creeping nihilism should rule. But it does suggest that improvements to the dynamic of capitalist urbanization should be viewed as a general evolutionary process and not consequent upon some essentialist doctrine about a better society.

In order to explore these issues, I will first address the literature on Bali to demonstrate that a dearth of theoretical interpretations relevant to Bali's development have seriously constrained our understanding. Next, I wish to excise two prevailing mythologies; first, that Bali has ever been, or ever will be, a paradise island; and second, that tourism and tourists are destroying the island and its 'culture'. I then raise the issue of traditional Balinese architecture and its typologies to demonstrate why the new Balinese architecture *must not take the form of appliqué and copying details* as it does at present. It must reinterpret the spirit and meaning of Balinese traditional built form, but differently. Finally I suggest that this can best be accomplished through a serious consideration of three working ideas – Vernacular Transformations (Cuthbert 2012); a Culture of Critical Regionalism, (Kenneth Frampton 1983, 1988) and the

New Urbanist agenda (Andreas Duany 2002).

Perspectives on Bali

The problematic of defining culture is enduring. If we accept Castells observation (above) that urban culture is a myth, then the task seems somewhat pointless. If in fact culture has mythical status, its capacity to interpret and resist the structural contradictions inherent in capitalist development must be seriously constrained. For example, many years ago E.T. Hall offered his *Matrix of Culture* that had ten different components and 89 elementary interactions. More recently, Thomas Hobart gives fifteen types of usage of the term *culture*, (Hobart 2002: 34-35). So the last fifty years of cultural studies have involved the vexed if not impossible task of defining culture. We can speculate on three significant reasons for the continuing hiatus. First as indicated above, each attempt at definition offers only a sliver of culture as a totality, a bit like trying to understand a forest by looking at a single tree. Second, and following from this, a general retreat into postmodernity and discourse analysis has fractured any possible coherent view, not only of culture, but of production and history as well. Third, and most importantly, culture is an epiphenomenon, floating as it does on the material production of social life. It is not an independent dimension of development as a whole. By abstracting culture away from production and the political and economic realities of the island, a distorted picture of Balinese life has been promoted. Consequently, the fundamental material structures of urban life; particularly that of space, are seldom addressed.

While anthropological and cultural studies have dominated research, they have also presented a somewhat limited, sectarian picture of life in Bali. Nonetheless it is important at the outset to recognise the excellence and scholarship of those involved(Covarrubias 1936, Geertz 1980, Vickers 1989, 1996, and Picard 1996.Despite such scholarship, some have come under

serious criticism, not only for the limited bias of the studies, but their blindness to the reality of the times e.g. 'important as they were [the Geertz's research] as anthropological studies, to a political historian these early postwar works are remarkable for their lack of attention to time, place, or historical and political context beyond the village level' Robinson (1995:8)This work lacked the insight offered by Marxist scholars Godelier and Thom, which suggested now anthropological studies should be fundamentally economic in focus (1980). Since that time, discourse analysis has become the chosen method in both historical and cultural studies, disciplines strong in method and weak in theory (Celik and Fabro 1988). The fundamental problem with discourse analysis is that the number of possible discourses is infinite. A collection of discourses will never be greater than the sum of the parts. As methodology, discourse analysis has proven incapable of generating a political agenda, and hence any substantial critique of, or resistance to, pre-existing capitalist development. Hence their explanatory power is weak, for the reason that '*Economic action underlies specific socio-cultural rules which set down what is fitting or what is inappropriate'* and such action is seldom addressed (Hobart et al 1996:46). Despite this, any criticism really has to be in the other direction –Not 'why have art and culture been so successful at what they do?' but 'Why have interpretations of Balinese life been so one-sided, thus creating a bias in our vision of social life on the island?' 'Why has the political economy of space been largely ignored, and why is available literature on the subject as rare as hens' teeth?'

Interpretations of architectural and urban form in Bali have fallen victim to a similar fate. Architectural forms are seen to arise from the architectural imagination; from individual genius and the Eureka principle; not the spatial political economy of the island. The dominant view that *architecture is an expression of culture* avoids the issue of the economy and urban politics (as if somehow

the built environment emanated from a nefarious and indefinable cultural logic). This argument is not however a revisionist attempt at determinism, rather a revanchist one to reclaim lost territory. It *is* a call to recognize that in the construction of culture, the economic and political dimension is formative in the production of architecture and social space, and this foundation has all but been neglected to date in Balinese studies.

To my knowledge, only four authors challenge the supremacy of history, anthropology and culture in Bali. The first is H.S. Nordholt and three of his books –*Bali: Colonial Conceptions and Political Change 1700-1940* (1986), *The Spell of Power: A History of Balinese Politics* (1996), and most recently; *Bali- an Open Fortress, 1995-2005: Regional Autonomy, Electoral Democracy and Entrenched Identities* (2008).The second is Geoffrey Robinson's *The Dark Side of Paradise* (1995), a classic in Balinese studies for its no-holds barred position. The third is a series of devastating papers by George Aditjondro (1997, 2007, 2010), but specifically- *Bali, Jakarta's Colony – Social and Ecological Impacts of Jakarta Based Conglomerates in Bali's Tourism Industry* (1995). Fourthly, an undercurrent of political economy has also been used by Suartika (2008) in her insightful text *Morphing Bali* (2010), one that steers in the direction of significant understanding of the state and its conflicting role in social change. Closely related are works by Cribb (1990), and Connell (1993). Taken together, they represent the only substantial analysis of Balinese economy and politics to address the fundamental relationship between culture and production. Each constitutes a seminal attempt to correct the ideological bent in Balinese studies that has remained closeted for seventy five years since Covarrubias (1936) and De Zoete, Beryl and Spies, W. (1938).

Despite these insights, one key central reason why Balinese studies have been so compromised is due to the overbearing myth of *Paradise*, one that has focused attention on the exotic nature of Balinese Hinduism, its art and ceremony. This has been to the

detriment of any real exposé of the historical and contemporary conditions of existence on the island. In order to introduce some rationality into the picture and clarify the problematic of development, this is the first myth that needs put to rest.

Paradise: The Past

Realism belies the illusion of paradise and suggests that the political economy of Bali and the reality of human experience has been one of enduring, poverty, starvation, slavery, disease, conflict, violence and massacres having to be endured over centuries of domination by Rajas, Dutch imperialism, the Japanese occupation and Suharto's New Order. A few examples may suffice to make the point. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, famines and civil wars between provinces had to be added to volcanic eruptions, including plagues of smallpox, malaria, dengue fever and other tropical diseases, and 'In the mountainous regions, goiters are extremely common; in some districts more than half the population are affected by them' (Picard 1996:30). Layered over enduring poverty was the institution of slavery, and 'from the mid seventeenth century onwards, slaves were Bali's 'most lucrative cash crop'….'where all prisoners and their entire families were sold as slaves so that we (the rajas) have money to buy opium'(Pringle 2004:84; Van der Kraan 1983). Pringle goes on to note that slavery was deliberately manufactured through social institutions such as the justice system where slavery was the fine for the inability to pay for a 'crime' (such as poverty). The use of opium was ubiquitous across the entire caste system, both as entertainment for the rich and an escape from enduring hopelessness for the poor. Opium was later to be monopolized by Dutch merchant capital as an important source of revenue, a means of exchange and a form of social control. Later, a 1935 government report 'noted that Bali's smallholders "could scarcely make ends meet, and that the general state of health on the island was poor, with

high levels of malnutrition, tuberculosis and venereal disease" and even before the full effects of the depression of the early 1930's 'whoever gets to know more fully the living conditions of the ordinary man in Bali quickly discovers what a grey and impoverished mass of humanity populates this beautiful island." (Robinson 1995:52-53). On a personal note, one of my wife's 'grandmothers' had eleven children, ten of whom died, and even over the last century, this kind of existential agony was widespread.

While poverty was endemic, as recently as the early 1960's hyperinflation and drought meant that death by starvation and malnutrition were widespread. This was compounded by a succession of rat and mouse plagues, insect infestations and crop failures between 1962 and 1965, and by the eruption of Gunung Agung early in 1963- '*This series of catastrophes destroyed 125,000 hectares of land and created 85,000 refugees'* (Robinson 1995:239). Two years later, Bali was affected by one of the greatest atrocities of the twentieth century. Major-General Suharto's thugs massacred up to one million so-called 'communists' across the archipelago, and *'Between December 1965 and early 1966, an estimated 80,000 people [in Bali] were shot, knifed, hacked or clubbed to death'* (Robinson 1995:273*).* Evidence suggests that American intervention into Indonesian politics was also a stimulus to the massacre, presumably a reflection of the rampant anti-communist agendas of McCarthyism (Scott 1985, Mehr 2009). Even today, approaching 200,000 Balinese live in poverty, particularly in Buleleng and Karangasem province, poverty being defined as having an income *less than $US2 per day*. While historical fact seriously questions anthropological and cultural perspectives of a peaceful idyllic existence in Bali filled with bare breasts and wonderful ceremonies, present day life merely swaps one set of problems for another. So whatever happened to paradise, or did it in fact, ever exist? What of today?

Paradise: The Present

Living in Bali in a local area with a Balinese wife and extended family, I witness on a day to day basis the total absence of paradise for most Balinese people. Life is *de facto* an endless struggle to survive in a third world country. The environment is unfriendly. People are drenched with tropical downpours in the wet season, and roasting heat in the dry. Infrastructure is poor, with virtually no piped water or gas. There is also no sewerage, and most houses have their own septic tank. Electricity is rationed with frequent black-outs; domestic water supply is non- existent and a well is mandatory, with effects on pollution and depletion of the water table as yet uncalculated. For all practical purposes, there is no public transport. There are no driving tests and until now, licenses for both cars and motorcycles have simply been purchased for a fee, hence the entire population has neither driver training nor road sense. Ten year old children can be seen driving motor cycles. Bribes are paid for traffic infringements since it is cheaper than paying the fine. So the roads are supremely dangerous and also largely unpaved in local areas. Combining this with no mandatory pollution controls on vehicles, uncontrolled building and the generalized domestic burning of garbage, the air in Denpasar is frequently polluted and filthy. Garbage collection comes at a cost that many are unwilling or unable to pay, and any available space may become a rubbish dump, particularly in the countryside. Even after collection, recycling and disposal are problematic.

As to social issues, employment for most represents bare survival, and a recent example was given in Bali of two young waitresses working seven days a week, 8am till 11 pm for IR 500,000 per month -105 hours for $AU 55.00, or fifty cents an hour (Boughton 2012). Wages are extremely low and 'minimum wages' are negotiable. A labourer on a building site working eight hours in 32 degrees of heat will be lucky to make AU$ 5 per day, not much more than your average *café latte* in Sydney. A middle class

professional feels happy with a basic salary of around US$ 8,000 per annum. Social services are poor. There is no general medicare system, and medical costs are unaffordable for many. A plague of dengue fever in 2010 had 1000 persons per month entering hospital including myself, and the threat of rabies is an everyday reality. Charities struggle to provide e.g. adequate assistance for children with cleft palates and blinding infections, and cataracts for the elderly. In employment, nepotism abounds across the board and jobs that offer good prospects for bribery are actually marketed, albeit unofficially. Corruption permeates society like water in a sponge. In addition, the strict social conventions that Balinese people have had to live by in the past, and to a degree today, are legion, a regimen of social control that most people in developed countries could not submit to. Without doubt paradise has absented itself from daily life, both historically and today, yet it remains omnipresent in the popular consciousness - *How to Retire in Bali: and Live in Paradise* (Henry, M. 2011)

Despite the rather black picture painted above to counter the paradise myth with certain realities, new hospitals are being built, rabies is in decline, experiments in public transport undertaken, existing electric power stations are being upgraded, a new international airport terminal at Ngura Rai is under construction, with another airport planned in the North. As is usual, the Balinese people take life with their usual fortitude and grace and face down the exigencies of daily life with impunity. After all, the myth of paradise did not emanate from them, but from Western romantic traditions to which I now turn.

Paradise: The Myth

Overall, the assumed existence of paradise has been confined almost exclusively to middle class Western romantics - artists, intellectuals, academics and travelers, although more recently local businesses have propagated the myth to increase tourist revenues. Many seemed blind to the reality of life from

inside the culture, and have chosen to ignore the conditions of existence of most Balinese over the last few hundred years. Blissed-out personal indulgence in so called *paradise* prevailed over the daily lives of slaves, serfs, indentured labour, sharecroppers or peasants. The arrival of mass consumption added to the problem when the mythology of heaven on earth rapidly became subjected to the blind gaze of international tourism along with 'the journey to see what has already become banal,' (Debord 1967). The lived experience of the Balinese people over the last few centuries does not support the idea of an ecstatic existence, either historically or today.

In reality, the Balinese have never lived on a paradise island, nor has anyone else. Paradise is an imaginary construct usually with religious overtones, most frequently applied by individuals to some idealized situation that maximizes their capacity for self indulgence. Overall, local culture met the superficial needs of the paradigm, most forgetting that culture is not a means of pleasure but a means of social control. That paradise is a collective experience, rather than a personal ideology is indeed a grave error. The concept has been embedded in Western art and society in the form of utopias, at least since Plato's *Republic* (400BC). Indeed as early as 1597 Dutch sailors returned to Holland to report the discovery of *a new paradise* (Covarrubias1937:29). Architecture and urban planning are also littered with utopian dreams, from Vitruvius ideal city of 40B.C. to Le Corbusier's Ville Radieuse (1935). So paradise – the lived experience of utopia, is a mythology closely tied to religion, literature and architecture. As a construct the concept of paradise exists in several dimensions- as a method of social control, of raising revenues, of hope in compensation for suffering, or in certain middle and upper class circles, as a temporary escape into primitivism unaffordable by the working classes anywhere. All religions offer the promise of paradise to come in different models; they are most often bought on the basis of surrendering

rationality and science; of personal responsibility for action, and with unproven rewards available only after death. Ideologies do the same, and the philosophy of Marx and Engels suggested a more politically oriented paradise in *The Communist Manifesto* (1872). So *paradise* offers the illusion of ecstasy in some form, one seldom if ever delivered except perhaps momentarily through chemistry (De Quincy 1821, Huxley 1954). Added to this, neither the historical nor the cultural studies that have dominated Balinese research and scholarship are known for their explanatory power in the arena of economic development and politics, arguably the most significant factors in any country let alone Bali. History is a discipline that is almost devoid of substantial theory, relying on epistemology (method) for historical explanation hence –

> The past we study as historians is not the past 'as it really was'. Rather it is what it felt like to be in it. The growing bibliography of the history of passions, sentiments, sensibilities and anxieties and the like is a measurable recognition of this. (Fernandez-Armesto 2002:155).

From the above it must now be clear that Balinese ideologues prefer to live in a simulacrum of their own creation with one foot in reality and another in never- never land, rather than recognise the actual historical and material conditions of the people. At the same time as artists such as Walter Spies was following Paul Gauguin's lead in Tahiti, steeping himself in the culture of this paradise island (1932), a more astute Dutch administrator wrote 'Whoever gets to know the situation of the common man in Bali from close [up] only then discovers what a poverty stricken mass of people inhabit this beautiful island, and the poverty is on the increase (Pringle 2004:116). So the term *paradise* is bereft of any real analytical content and arguably constitutes a huge barrier to solving the existential conditions of global tourism now inundating the island. Yet the unreality of paradise and the associations that Bali has been burdened with over the last century remain firmly embedded today. The

resulting tourist tsunami might be satisfactorily reduced and reality encountered if in fact tourists were informed not only that paradise had now been lost, but that it had never really existed. What then of tourism?

The Tourist Paradox

Today Bali is a global tourist centre that generates 70% of Indonesia's tourist income, with a resident population approaching 4 million people. Where this revenue goes is a matter for speculation, but it is a sum now exceeding US$ 7 Billion. Most of this is shipped to Jakarta. In addition, Bali generates US$ 56 million from tourist visas alone, none of which remains in Bali. If the island only retained a fraction of this wealth, it could establish much needed infrastructure, services and transport. Despite the dearth of funds, the situation is designed to get worse. Governor Pastika targets 5 million international tourists and 10 million domestic by 2015 (Bali Times 20-26:2011). Since three million international tourists will visit Bali this year, the target is 66% over existing in three years time. Unsatisfied with this, local government has plans to open a second airport, in order to channel growth from Denpasar and Nusa Dua in the south, to Buleleng and Singaraja in the North. But even without this massive increase in capacity, it is clear that Bali's infrastructure cannot even handle *existing* tourist numbers in addition to its own population growth.

Yet at the forefront of prevailing issues, global tourism is held to blame for many of the environmental problems now plaguing the island. This can only be viewed as a serious denial of responsibility, since all policies regarding tourism, investment, taxation, development control, land use policy, infrastructure improvement, environmental damage etc., remain in the hands of national and local government, not individual tourists. Indeed the ideology that 'tourism' is to blame runs so deep that the Chairman of Bali's Tourism Board, Ngurah Wijaya

complained publicly that tourists were 'stingy' since they were not spending enough money and in addition were responsible for infrastructure problems and pollution (Bali Times May 1st 2012). Ten years previously tourists were staying on average, one week and spending US$300 per day. Today they only stay three or four days and spend US$100. To quote Bapak Wijaya, 'When they [tourists] come, we have serious problems of traffic and waste. The island becomes dirty.' (Bali times V8 No 8:2). The corollary would seem to be that if the tourists did not come then everything would be fine. Karazija's detailed response in the same issue was truly devastating and the government has much to learn from it.

Nonetheless, and as a matter of fact, while tourist numbers have increased, revenues have certainly dropped. What Bapak Wijaya seems to have missed (political acumen and respect apart) is that tourism is not an independent factor in urbanisation. It cannot be excised from development as a whole. The following month, Governor I Made Mangku Pastika reinforced this fact with some candor when he said that tourism had been a disaster for the poor, since the basic necessities of life are becoming more expensive. Bapak Pastika placed the blame squarely at the feet of the various regencies. He admitted failure in persuading them, first that a synergistic poverty eradication program was necessary, and second, that a ban on further tourist accommodation developments was required. This was due he stated 'to selfish egos, and also political interests' (Bali Times V8 No 16:1). This is a partial truth at best, since the attempt to decentralize Jakarta's absolute control in the Regional Autonomy Policy of 2001 rendered the provinces, and hence the regional governors bereft of power 'The post- Dili paranoia that gripped Jakarta meant that districts/ regencies (kabupaten), not provinces- were given this power, in the fear that a genuine transfer of authority to provinces might induce them to break away from Jakarta's grip (Karazija2012). So in reality Bali actually needs *nine*

Tourist Boards, one for each autonomous regency (kabupaten) and one for Denpasar (kota), since the provincial heads across Indonesia, Bali included, have been emasculated by national government in the interests of its own perceived security. This situation inevitably flows into every region of Bali's economy, with development, urban planning and tourism being subject to somewhat fractured political and planning processes at best.

Nevertheless, it is glaringly obvious that tourism could easily be controlled by keeping the current airport as it is, and deliberately limiting the numbers of domestic and international tourists to existing levels or below. The simplest thermostat to the system is the cost of a visa, which could be raised from the prevailing US$ 25 for thirty days stay, to US $100, US$ 500 or US$ 1000 until a satisfactory relationship was established between tourist numbers and available infrastructure. Since there is also a departure tax, this too could be raised in proportion. Somehow this does not seem to hold much appeal. Following from this, we must also interrogate the claim that tourism is destroying the island, a view that clearly permeates the highest levels of government. As a matter of fact, *tourism* cannot be held accountable for destroying anything, since legislation, finance and ideology are firmly in the hands of the national, regional and local political processes.

But nested inside the first level of critique that tourism is destroying the environment lies a second, that it also destroys cultural traditions. But the idea that Balinese culture and traditions are being destroyed, if indeed this is true, has nothing to do with tourism, but with the Balinese themselves. Sacred rituals do not have to be commodified, cremations turned into spectacles, temple precincts turned into markets, and cartoons made of historic dance rituals such as the Mahabharata. Over and above the problems of tourism, poverty and local culture, the built environment of the island is in meltdown, specifically its capital Denpasar, which is plagued by a planning system

that appears unable to control development. In addition, an appropriate morphing of traditional Balinese architecture into a meaningful modernity (or post-modernity) has escaped the islands architects and any thought of a *Balinese New Urbanism* cannot be found anywhere in the academic literature. In order to understand why the coherence of the past has been sacrificed to the incoherence of the present we need to briefly look at the system of spatial typologies that guided habitation for centuries.

The Asiatic Mode of Production

The central reason why urban development in Bali is so chaotic has causes beyond the political. At the most fundamental the actual distribution of villages followed Christaller's theorem, that villages would tend to be spread evenly over the territory, modified by landscape and the general productivity of the soil. In other words the village size was dictated by the extent of the hinterland to be farmed and the amount of food that could be produced. Much of this was predicated simply by topography and walking distance from the centre. A natural progression of a few higher order centres would naturally occur based on the provision of specialized activities that individual villages could not provide for themselves. Within the system of villages, Balinese Hinduism as deployed through the Adat (traditional law) adopted a generic system of spatial relationships for village organization (Figure 2). The same procedure applied to the exhaustive process of building specific architectural typologies in accordance with traditional rules and ceremonies (Macrae2000).So in pre- colonial times, a uniform urban design and architectural consciousness prevailed that was inseparable from the daily life of the people. Colonization had only a slight effect on the production of social space, largely due to minimalist intervention into Balinese social relations in order to keep social unrest to a minimum. Rapidly a stable feudal mode of production based in hydraulic society shifted to one of

merchant capitalism under the Dutch, and to crony capitalism under Suharto (Anderson 1988,1998, Aditjondro 2000, 2007). New spatial structures were erected on the basis of new modes of production. But the chasm that opened up as urbanisation progressed separated tradition from development, and the spatial uniformity of feudalism collapsed as the incoherence of capitalist urbanisation swamped the island.

Overall the traditional spatial political economy of the island had five main dimensions, namely:

- The capacity of the land to produce material wealth and its mode of production.
- The forms of labour necessary to work the land,
- The appropriation of surplus value in relation to the shifting social hierarchy.
- The ideological systems that supported social exploitation (religion, caste, customary law, commonly held beliefs etc.)
- The resultant spatial arrangements emerging from the relations of production.

During feudalism (and I appreciate this terminology is consequential when applied to Asiatic societies) – the caste system combined with the economic order demanded specific building typologies in accordance with this principle. Typologies of architectural and urban space arose that served the basic needs of social reproduction as well as the symbolic requirements of Balinese Hinduism. While builders built most of the buildings in feudal times, the demand for specific building forms arose from society, not from the imagination of architects (Cuthbert 1986). The basic tenet of any social theory of architecture is that architectural typologies emerged from the internal dynamics of modes of production. So it is not a question of which comes first, the chicken or the egg, here the egg comes first (Omphalos). Bali is no different, and the typologies of buildings and spaces emerged directly from the needs of the people.

In greater detail, the integrity of the village system reflected the economic base of the island. Much land remained

under the collective ownership or management of the Banjar, as it does today in the villages. While domestic property may be owned, such ownership is custodial since the home is held in perpetuity on behalf of the ancestors. Principles of land tenure were therefore symbolic rather than actual. While such ideology holds sway even today in the various *banjar*, the actual material conditions of production were as mercenary here as they were elsewhere. Hobart et al (1996) note the increasing fragmentation of estates over the years. They comment that in the rigid social hierarchy from King to slave, almost anybody could own land. While the Raja held overall sway in the decision making process, in practice, land was used as a form of political control; as an affirmation of power; it was offered for favours; inherited in dowries; leased to individuals or traded for products; and was defined in reference to the various clans, banjars, subak and temple associations, and other community groups. The basic relations of production are shown below (Table 1).

Table 1. Class and caste structure in relation to forms of labour and capital

	Social Class	**Caste**	**Association**	**Form of Labour**	**Form Of Capital**	**House Form**
1	King / regent	Ksatria	security	security/defense	land, labour and money capital	puri
2	Aristocracy	Ksatria	security	security/defense	land, labour and money capital	puri
3	Priesthood	Brahma	ritual	knowledge	symbolic	griya
4	Traders	Weisya	commerce	business	land/capital/ commodities	jero
5	Serfs	Sudra	free labour	predominantly manual/corvée	none	umah
6	Slaves	Sudra	Bonded labour	predominantly manual/corvée	none	none

The point to be made here is that urban and architectural forms are not fundamentally *architectural* typologies, they are social typologies based in caste, class, and capital first, and only secondly as built form. During the Feudal period in Europe,

Kings and Princes did not live in castles because they needed vast amounts of space. The dynamics of medieval society were such that wars took place between city states and fortresses were required to house the village or town population during periods of siege. Similarly, the Ufizzi Gallery in Florence is well known as one of the most lavish art galleries in the world. But unless one speaks Italian, the fact that Uffizi simply means 'office' is seldom known. This archetypal *office* came into being as a demand of merchant capitalism for a form of space within which the legal basis for trade could be executed according to contract law. This basic idea applies across all modes of production, and Bali is no different.

Some of these dimensions need qualified. We must note that social division via the 'caste' system (Warna) in Bali does not have the same connotation that it does in India. In fact it in many ways 'caste' is a misnomer. The four classes are Brahma, Ksatria, Weisya and Sudra. Warna is much more of an employment classification than it is of religion or even social class, and movement between levels in the hierarchy is possible. For example, a wife will take her husband's caste on marriage, moving up or down depending upon the caste of her father. In addition, architectural typologies were basic as they related to employment and social groupings, but complex within each typology. Overall only three basic typologies prevailed, namely temples (pura), balai banjar /desa (community halls), and homes. But each of these typologies incorporated other spatial and building forms. For example agricultural or industrial buildings did not exist as such, since each home had its own rice barn as part of its internal organization. Similarly each home also had both private and collective space for social interaction and production, and even its own temple in the form of the family shrine. Similarly the Bale Kulkul (bell tower) was a community building that was usually located within temples. Community buildings formed part of each temple precinct, and

the relationships between individuals and temples reflected the complexity of the social structure. These are shown in Table 2 below.

Table 2: Spaces for ritual purposes per social hierarchy

Social Groups	Level	Space	Translation
• Brahmana • Ksatrya • Weysia • Sudra	Family	1. Merajan/Sanggah	Family shrine
			Family shrine
	Clan	1. Pura Kawitan	Clan temple
		2. Pura Dadya	Clan temple
	neighbourhood temple	1. Pura Banjar	Clan temple
	Village	1. Pura Kahyangan Tiga: 2. Pura Desa, 3. Pura Dalem, 4. Pura Puseh	The three village temples 2, 3, and 4, the three temples composing (1)
	Island	1. Pura Sad Kahyangan	Island temple. General access
		2. Pura Kahyangan Jagat	e.g. Pura Besakih
	Profession	1. Pura Melanting	Trader temple
		2. Pura Dugul	Subak temple

The Transition to Capitalism

The transition from the Merchant capitalism of the Dutch to fully fledged 'democratic' capitalist state in Indonesia has been a slow and painful process, one still in a state of flux, although the deposing of Suharto in 1998 offered hope of a more rosy future. The central problem is that the relations of crony capitalism will take generations to unravel, due to the embedded nature of Suharto's legacy, in Bali, Indonesia as a whole and overseas (Aditjondro 1995, 2000, 2007, Anderson 1988,1998). In the Philippines whose political economy has been described as 'Cacique Democracy' – a feudal national government under local political bosses, power was located in some nine families that owned vast landholdings, with overall political by the Marcos dictatorship. Under Suharto, dictatorship was largely a private

partnership between the military, big capital and Suharto family interests. The prime function of the state was to legitimize this relationship, which at its most elementary was the transfer of its own resources, i.e. that of the people, into private sector monopolies. Overall, recent history may be divided into five main phases, along with the basic strategies towards urban space implicit in each period, namely:

Dutch colonialism until 1945 – Colonial society (Colonial institutions and practices, urban design as a symbol of Dutch Imperialism). Art Deco (European) Architecture favoured in key locations e.g. Bandung. Javanese Art Deco of the 1920's formed the basis for the national style adopted post 1950.

Sukarno elected in 1945 – Post-colonial, democratic society, still dominated by Dutch interventionism. Urban design attempts socialist/Communist influences. Nationalism, monuments, grand boulevards, institutions as symbols of state power and authority, attempts at social housing etc.

Sukarno dies in 1970 – 28 years of dictatorship follows. This is characterized by Benedict Anderson's classic phrase re the Philippines, that Indonesia was organised on the politics of a well- run casino. Privatisation of state assets. Continued nationalism of a different order. Urban design as a direct reflection of individual, family, and corporate wealth.

Suharto deposed 1998 – Decade of crony capitalism. Globalisation impacts with considerable force. Urban design as International design - Growth of malls, shopping centres, tourist enclaves. Multinational companies locating on major transport hubs and in wealthier districts in Jakarta etc. The wholesale establishment of monopolies to benefit the ruling oligarchy and military power, most of which remain in place today.

1998 – 2012 – Free elections to be governed by the party of choice.

As indicated, each of these phases held assumptions about development, planning and urban design, elucidated in two excellent books by Abidin Kusno, particularly the latest *The Appearances of Memory. Mnemonic Practices of Architecture and*

Urban Form in Indonesia (Kusno 2010). These momentous shifts at a national level had direct impacts on Bali, primarily in that it represented a monumental opportunity for capital accumulation and exploitation of one of the world's more unspoiled tourist destinations. George Aditjondro claims that the people of Bali had no say in the creation of the tourist boom, which largely benefitted transnational capital and Jakarta conglomerates, one in which the Suharto family had a massive stake. These included partnerships, shareholding and outright ownership, variously including the Salim Group, the Sultan of Brunei, Japan Airlines, Udayana Army Division, Singapore Hotel properties, Garuda Indonesia, Sempati Air, Gatari Air, Aerowisata, the Coca Cola franchise, Utel French Multinational Company etc. These and other cartels monopolised or had shares in the entire tourist apparatus – tourist agencies, airlines, air cargo shipping, ground transport, hydrofoil and marine transport, hotels, bars and nightclubs, and leisure activities such as golf, rafting, cultural villages. Even the supply of drinking water to Nusa Dua was monopolized. Overall the Balinese paid the social and environmental cost and big capital took the profits, reinvesting the bounty overseas for example, New Zealand, the Philippines, the United States and other countries (Aditjondro 1995). This parasitic investment pattern had numerous deleterious effects; the erosion of the subak or rice growing system was advanced through legitimate development, blackmail and outright thuggery. Purchase of rice fields was used to deprive others of water and thence to acquire more land, development control was largely ignored, and free reign was taken by the private sector for across the board exploitation of labour, natural resources and the culture industry. Aditjoro lists some 45 enterprises in Bali alone in 1997 where the Suharto clan had interests or ownership e.g. Nusa Dua Beach Hotel, Nikko Hotel, Sheraton Nusa Dua, Bali Intercontinental, the Four Seasons and many others.

The point here is that private monopolies, combined with

a disdain for legality had free reign to cater for the needs of global tourism. Hence new spatial typologies were written on the landscape of tradition as indicated above. Since the spatial syntax of everyday life did not correspond to the space of global tourism, conflict occurred across the spectrum of social life. Traditional patterns of movement based on the life of the banjar were fractured and subdued to the needs of capital. Prime among these has been the conflict across all coastal areas and prime beachfront. The three most important dimensions here have been the problem of access for Naben ceremonies, the use of temples as cultural capital for resort development and ignoring the 100 metre building limit from high water mark of Ordinary Spring Tides. (HWMOST). In addition, local people have been excluded *de facto* from the use of beachfront due to the activities of private security in front of most beachfront resorts, the most recent example being that of Nusa Dua. Rather than integrating tradition with development, they grew further and further apart. Embedded in this entire process was the necessary commodification of Balinese traditions as a vital stage in their conversion into capital assets. Arguably, Balinese 'culture' in its entirety was a manufactured phenomenon. As George Robinson notes:

> 'The "traditional" Bali so admired by travelers and scholars alike is a product of political calculation and conservative political objectives… The Bali myth has helped to falsify history in a way that has served the people in power while silencing those who have suffered injustice'.

For the Suharto regime and its cronies, Bali was a cash cow waiting to be milked. But in order for the milking to take place, Balinese culture had to be commodified across the entire spectrum of social life, so that it could be turned into saleable enterprises. Despite the plethora of books on Balinese 'culture' it was not in fact a product of Balinese identity, but one of capitalist market principles. Consequently, once the Balinese themselves

entertained the idea that *they had a 'culture'*, something that previously had never been considered, the stage was set for big capital to exploit the opportunities that Bali had to offer. As I have maintained before, traditionally *the Balinese had no art* since the society was not a marketplace where traditions and traditional manufactured goods were sold for profit. The Barong for example was one of a series of ritual masks that were blessed for use in temple ceremonies. It was not a commodified good, which if the Balinese saying 'we have no art, we do everything as well as we can' is true, they had already recognised this fact themselves. The difference is between social life as experience, where it is not abstracted away from daily life as a whole, and that of the market system and western romantic mysticism. The recognition of their own experience qua tradition as a saleable commodity represented a climacteric in the potential for capital formation and the end of *traditional* Balinese social life as it has been perceived. In other words, culture is a form of consciousness and an ideology that shifts in relation to a new mode of production, or indeed, as in the case of Bali, is demanded by it. The conscious acceptance of Balinese culture by the Balinese people marked a climacteric in the capacity of capital to exploit what is now termed *the Culture Industry* (Scott 2000). Whereas previously culture had been seen as a non-economic activity, capitalist development has even managed to vacuum culture into its system of production. Overall it would seem that Balinese identity may have suffered in the process, since its 'authenticity' may now be questioned in the face of the capitalist market system (Picard 2008).

Balinese Society and Space

In contrast to the casino mentality over space and culture, traditional Balinese society had a well-ordered and comprehensible spatial order, from basic shelter to the palaces of the kings. Part of the reason why the spatial system did not

evolve any serious urban hierarchy was due to the fact that power was disseminated among the eight regencies, guaranteeing that a strong central state would not exist. Hence a hierarchic structure of institutions and spaces did not evolve. For all practical purposes, spatial hierarchy at the village level was as complex as structuring attained. The transition to modernity demanded that a new hierarchy was established, one for which tradition had no vocabulary, either literally or spatially, yet it was somehow enveloped by it. The danger existed, then and now, that traditional Balinese architecture would become a disparate series of Disneylands shared equally between tourists and local people. As in many other cultures, the vexed question arose 'what is the relationship between so called *traditional architecture* and that of modernity? How is it to retain its dignity in the face of postmodern tourist development? These questions break down into many others:

- How are the spatial forms of the past to be adequately accommodated?
- What is an appropriate urban architectural lexicon for Bali that preserves traditions, yet at the same time adapts and transforms them to new uses?
- How should the basic tenets of Balinese architecture be accommodated, not merely within modernity, but within postmodernity today?
- How can the same principles be used when the structural capacity of these forms cannot be applied to larger, more complex buildings?
- Is then the ubiquitous practice of pasting traditional bas-relief mouldings to the outside of buildings an adequate response to the problem?
- How should a new Balinese architectural and urban form differ from that of adjacent economies e.g. Malaysia, Thailand, and the Philippines?
- How can all of this be institutionalized through regulation, codes of practice, design guidelines, and other mechanisms traditionally used to control development?

Given the usual space limitations, these questions will have to be researched and answered in detail by the state, the academy and the professions. Nonetheless it is possible to sketch out a way forward by addressing three important dimensions of the new spatial practices set out above. So I will first address the general definition and adoption of a culture of critical regionalism that Bali should follow in order to retain its sense of self. Second, vernacular transformations play a huge role in this process, and an understanding of the larger purposes of the vernacular need to be understood if any significant transformations of architectural and urban space are to proceed. Third, an urban process/style now attaining serious attention is what is termed the *New Urbanism*, and the overall principles, practices and limitations of this movement need to be evaluated in the context of Balinese traditions.

A Culture of Critical Regionalism.

Many years ago, Kenneth Frampton wrote a landmark article called *Towards a Critical Regionalism- Six points for an Architecture of Resistance*, one that was to resonate for years (Frampton 1983).It was followed by another, *Place-Form and Cultural Identity* (Frampton1988 in Thackera). In the first article, Frampton moved against the universal thrust of modernism in architecture, by insisting that each region, wherever it existed should develop its own specific architectural style, one that reflected the landscape, culture and traditions of the region e.g. Bali. Since Bali is an Island *ergo* it is its own region and therefore demands its own style. In so arguing, Frampton rejected the sterility of modernist functionalism along with its effects – glass curtain walls, the stress on visible structure, the absence of ornament and tradition, rejection of difference, the wholehearted acceptance of mass production, the dehumanisation of labour etc. In other words the philosophy of *less is more* (Mies Van der Rohe); *form follows function* (Horatio Greenough); and *ornament*

is a crime (Adolph Loos); were all rejected and sent to the trash can by a diversity of scholars. Frampton's insistence on regional differences and identity implied, tacitly or otherwise, the continuation of vernacular traditions and associations, particularly in places where extremes of climate took place e.g. in tropical and sub-tropical areas such as Indonesia. Indeed in his second article, he states quite clearly 'that a more sensitive form of architecture could be found on the periphery of the so-called developed world, rather than in the apparent centres of cultural and communicational power, such as New York, London and Paris' (Frampton 1988:55). Importantly, he goes on to say:

I sensed that these interstitial cultural manifestations arose when there was a desire and willingness on the part of architects and their clients to develop a self-conscious and local contemporary expression; one which, while remaining committed to the modernisation process, would nonetheless be able to qualify the received consumerist civilization through a consciously cultivated *culture of place.* (My italics, Frampton 1988:55).

It is precisely these conditions that need to be cultivated in Bali, the prerequisite being *that a common consciousness must prevail*. This implies that *the prevailing anarchy of architectural individualism in Bali must be regulated, and to large extent sacrificed for the general good*. I will have more to say about this in context of the New Urbanism below. Let me be clear on this. I do not mean that architectural individualism should disappear, but the anarchic nature of the relations that connect and delineate 'the atoms of environmental structure' that configure Bali's cities must have an enforced and highly regulated development and enforced design codes in order to prevent sinking any further into the abyss (Alexander and Poyner 1967). Perhaps more is needed than the rule 'no higher than a palm tree' (Holland 1993). Frampton also argues that in promoting the idea of a critical regionalism (first formulated by Tzonis and Lefaivre in 1981) –

he is not proposing a mindless return to some form of vernacular revival. Instead, he suggests that a new architecture be based upon it, one that has the capacity to resist domination and hegemony, the prime force being that of the capitalist 'free' market system with its attendant qualities of corruption, competition, the cult of individualism, and a general resistance to regulation, control, and sacrifice for the general good. He makes the point that these forms of resistance are particularly important in post-colonial societies, when a new national identity is to be established at the cost, usually of the regional and local. Bali has been subject to all of these forces, and the impacts of dictatorship still have a powerful effect on the local economy in general and tourism in particular. While framing the idea of a critical architecture of resistance, what Frampton does not do is to delineate how the vernacular is to be meaningfully transformed without falling victim either to capitalist market forces, the incapacity of local government to implement a significant and encompassing design philosophy, and the profession to interpret it. I will now try and outline how this might be accomplished.

Vernacular Transformations

In a parallel paper to this one (and ideally it should be read first) – I explore the significance of the vernacular in the process of transforming architecture into new states: *Vernacular transformations – context, issues, debates* (Cuthbert 2012a). The basic thesis explored is that *the prime function of vernacular architecture is to inform the present*, not to study the past.

> 'If indeed this is true, then we need to recognize that vernacular architecture is not particularly interesting of itself. Most buildings are small, simple structures using available local materials. What *is* significant is how they reflect the ideological principles of tribal, feudal or capitalist social relations. So the vernacular is of fundamental interest in its representation of spatial political economy and how particular social and built forms morph into the new' (Cuthbert 2012a: 4-5).

Since the paper dealt with the subject generically, the basic method of analysis applies equally to Bali as it does elsewhere. It is merely a question of understanding the necessary and contingent features of the local environment in some detail (Sayer 1984).

Necessary features:

1 The social : *The social context of the vernacular as directed by class and caste structure.*

2 The Urban : *Transformation and location; the urban and the rural.*

3 Meaning : *The deconstruction of discourses and their revelation.*

4 History : *The narratives of the past and their significance for the present.*

Contingent features:

1 Ideological : *The expression of theories or guiding principles for built form.*

2 Aesthetic : *The appreciation of beauty and its conversion to new uses.*

3 Formal : *The evolution of simple forms to serve new functions and styles.*

4 Functional : *The adaptation of the vernacular to new functional attributes.*

5 Mimetic : *The representation or imitation of the 'real' world through art (architecture) takes many forms.*

6 Analogical : *The correspondence or partial similarity between things.*

7 Metaphoric : *Where a building is regarded as representative or symbolic of something else.*

8 Totemic : *The emblematic representation of a natural object or animals that holds spiritual significance.*

There are five important points to be made in relation to the above system and its application to Bali.

- First it suggests a taxonomy within which research categories can occur, and indicates what is important as well as what is not.
- Second, it exposes the weakness of trivially correct, descriptive, empirical research which takes place outside any theoretical framework. Benefits and deficiencies can both be clearly seen, given that at least eight other approaches are presented.

- Third, it offers an extended critical analysis of each category that locates vernacular research within a meaningful context. Individuals can see clearly where they fit into an overall system of analysis and design.
- Fourth, the system is constructed on the basis of theory that is transferable among and between categories.
- Finally, the same general principles apply to the *practice* of design. If an actual physical project does not fit into any of the eight contingent categories as a conceptual base, then it is apparent that the designer does not have a conscious theoretical approach to his/her building or research. It is either descriptive work or builds projects on the basis of 'watch my lips move'. While intuition cannot be ruled out entirely, it has serious limitations when applied to design outcomes.

Given this overall paradigm, the next question is how to implement the theoretical, regulatory and design frameworks that allow the overall system of urban management to function coherently, for academics to pursue research, and for agencies to modify their practices so they align with all prior ideas. In this task, the movement called *The New Urbanism* has much to offer, and the concept of a *Balinese New Urbanism* might be an appropriate flag to hoist in the interests of significant environmental change.

The New Urbanism

The New Urbanism is a movement that began approximately thirty years ago with its archetype framed in the development of a small town by the name of Seaside in Florida (Katz 1994). I have written extensively elsewhere on the New Urbanism (Cuthbert 2007 122-126, Cuthbert 2012, pp 121-30, pp 184-90), but also readers should refer to key references on the subject (Katz, 1994; Audirac and Shermyen1994; Banai, 1996; Al Hindi, K. F. and Staddon1997; Duany2000; Falconer 2001; Duany 2002; Talen 2006; Haas, T. 2008). All told, there is much debate as to the principles and practice of the New Urbanism and its devotees, and the basic philosophy is set out in its manifesto at www.cnu.

org/charter. The *New Urbanism* is an international movement with a momentum that affects all developing countries, whether first world or third. The problem is whether or not the principles and practices of the New Urbanism have been debated and some action taken, either in agreement or in disagreement. Before we can look at Bali in this light, a brief summary of the New Urbanism is necessary.



Figure 1 The New Urbanist Transect

The New Urbanism has its origins in the work of Patrick Geddes, a famous Scottish polymath and philosopher, and arguably the originator of modern town planning (Kitchen 1975, Meller 1990). The New Urbanism claims the work of three individuals as its intellectual and theoretical origins, namely Patrick Geddes (1915), Lewis Mumford (1961), and Ian McHarg (1969). The transect is claimed to serve both as an analytical method as well as a planning strategy that is conservationist in nature. The transect specifies seven zones of urbanization from the urban core to the rural reserve, and each is specified in detail (Figure.1). The design of each zone and each urban project within it will be based upon a highly configured *design code* that uses the transect principles as the governing dimensions of location and density. The towns of Celebration and Seaside, both in Florida represent seminal examples of design codes governing architectural creativity, and embodying the ideology of critical regionalism in

the United States (Figs 2, 3, 4, 5).

Figures 2 and **3** New Town of Celebration Florida

Figures 4 and 5 New Town of Seaside, Florida

Indeed the movement has now grown so large that it has councils in many other countries e.g. the U.K., Australia, etc. An evaluation of New Urbanist Design is now part of Malaysia's Tenth national Plan (p 256) under chapter six- 'Building an Environment that Enhances Quality of Life' and China's progress to *Making New Urbanism* is the subtitle to *China's Emerging Cities* (Wu 2008). Clearly the New Urbanist Agenda is now a global phenomenon. Most important however is the question of how this New Urbanism or 'Neo Traditionalism' deals with the problem of *the vernacular*, since this is our focus of concern in Bali. In principle the new urbanism is a revisionist movement in the sense that it revises and incorporates what has come before. So it is inherently oriented to the idea of the vernacular. This has resulted in some criticism over reactionary tendencies which perhaps too frequently copy the past rather than re-interpret

it. Because most architecture manages to attain unacceptable design standards on the basis of authorship, holding architects to a design vocabulary, and a standard pattern of set of processes and codes of practice seems like a good idea. In fact it follows the judgment of Le Corbusier who suggested a basic system of measurement designed to ensure harmonious proportions in architecture (le Corbusier 1980). When he was asked if his Modulor would guarantee beautiful architecture, he said no, but it would make bad architecture more difficult.

Making bad architecture more difficult is a laudable task, with significantly more social significance than encouraging good architecture to flourish, a process that clearly does not work. So urban development in Bali could do worse than adopt New Urbanist principles, starting with discussions of vernacular transformations and the New Urbanist *Weltanschauung*, and proceeding to establish design codes for each of its major cities such as Denpasar, Ubud, Klungkung, Singaraja etc. These would have to incorporate a hierarchy of codification in the case of Denpasar, which would require different design codes for each functional part of the transect, as well as specific design codes for every major project to be approved *prior to design being commenced*(not construction) – so that the rule system was in place before conception. Enforcement would have to be transparent and immediate, with heavy fines for bribery and development licenses granted outside standard regulatory procedures.

Conclusion: Towards a paradise of sensibility

Bali is not unique in its constant battle with development control over how to manage the built environment. But the fact that Denpasar is the last place tourists want to visit is testament in itself to serious problems. While many European cities are able to pedestrianise entire city centres, there is not a single pedestrianised street on the island. The evolution of a built environment that can not only withstand increased tourist

development but can also *encourage it* is indeed a challenge. In the above paper I have only been able to briefly sketch out what I would consider to be the inception of a strategy for future development, and much detail has of necessity been omitted. At the core of the problem are the vexed issues of the exploitation of Bali by central government, where only a fraction of Bali's wealth generation is retained. One of the great social theorists of the twentieth century, Eugene Habermas, pointed out that while political, economic and social problems were definitive, what was missing from analysis was the concept of distorted communication, and the fact that linguistic competence and management was a major component in the manipulation of the truth by those in power, usually in their own interests. This is certainly true in the management of urban affairs in Bali, where the *double entendre* prevails.

This double meaning exists across the ideological spectrum of urban affairs. The first example I have given is the mythology of a paradise island. The second myth, probably more significant today, is the false consciousness that tourism is the dominant source of all Bali's problems. The third, that tradition as *culture* prevails. This is a classic exercise in distorted communication. For as long as tourism can be blamed, responsibility for an efficient political system and enforcement of the law; for the imbalance of power between regencies and the Kota; for overbuilding tourist facilities; for appropriate funding to the island; for building necessary infrastructure; policing the roads; eliminating bribery within the judicial development control systems and the efficient collection and disposal of waste; can all be denied and blamed on external influences. Once these problems are solved, then perhaps tourism can be seen in its true light, a global phenomenon that needs to be efficiently managed and resourced wherever it occurs.

Economic and political issues apart, I have suggested that the overriding problem is how to creatively retranslate traditional

Balinese architecture. This has four components, the destruction of mythologies, generating a culture of critical regionalism, accepting vernacular transformation as fundamental building block of any design idiom, and a consideration of the New Urbanism. Taken together they offer the building blocks of a new Balinese Urbanism, each with a dominant role, first by the state, second by the academy and third by the profession. An important issue that has to be recognized across all three sectors is the fact that an urban design consciousness needs to be developed as the guiding mechanism that everyone can relate to.

The problem of the design of cities has long plagued architects and urban planners, and it is through the organization of built environment professions that the economy of cities is written into space. While architecture and urban planning have existed for over a century as recognized professions, urban design has never attained independence. It has always been assumed by architects that because they design buildings, so they can also be responsible for designing cities... Similarly urban planners make the same assumptions, on the basis that they are in charge of land use and development. Neither of these claims can be supported, and I have offered extensive arguments as to why urban design must be seen as a separate and independent activity, complete with its own theoretical and methodological base (Cuthbert 2003, 2006, 2007. 2011). What is required in Bali is a form of urban design consciousness that is appropriate to development in the age of globalization, one separate from, yet inclusive of tradition. Masters level programs are required which are open to architects, planners, civil engineers, builders, surveyors, lawyers etc, in other words anyone who already has a disciplinary base and who wants to extend their knowledge of designing cities. Individuals emerging from such a program would form the key components in the conservation of traditions and in the construction of a Balinese urbanism appropriate to the third millennium.

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