Securitization, Belonging and Politics of Belonging in Bali

I Wayan Suyadnya*

Abstrak

Artikel ini membahas kemunculan keamanan lokal (kelompok) dalam menanggapi otonomi daerah, dalam konteks globalisasi di Bali, Indonesia. Perkembangan otonomi daerah di Indonesia pasca reformasi telah mempengaruhi kondisi sosial, politik dan budaya daerah-daerah dan kabupaten-kabupaten di Indonesia, termasuk Provinsi Bali. Otonomi daerah saat ini diidentifikasi sebagai faktor yang mendorong perubahan sosial, politik dan budaya pada masyarakat Bali. Hal tersebut mengakibatkan peningkatan isu-isu keamanan lokal dalam konteks pelestarian budaya, ketegangan antar-kelompok etnis dan keamanan pariwisata. Berangkat dari situasi tersebut, artikel ini membahas bagaimana isu-isu otonomi daerah diinterpretasikan oleh aktor-aktor lokal dalam isu-isu keamanan bersama pada masyarakat Bali; dan melihat bagaimana kesadaran politik dan politik kepemilikan yang dikembangkan oleh aktor-aktor lokal untuk merekonstruksi identitas *kebalian* orang Bali. Politik kepemilikan adalah bentuk denaturalisasi peran aktor-aktor lokal untuk mengkonstruksi apa yang mereka sebut "rumah" dan rasa aman dari sudut pandang orang Bali.

Keywords: regional Autonomy (otoda), securitization, migration, politics of belonging, Globalization and Bali

Introduction: Security at Present

Security, in the context of cultural anthropology, is not an objective fact, but a concept that is socially constructed by a set of relations and discourses (Bratich 2006; Elmer and Opel 2006; Hay and Andrejvec 2006; Goldstein 2010). Security, one of the human needs proposed by Maslow, becomes an integral part of the lives of many individuals and composes human civilization throughout the ages until today. The 9/11 tragedy in the United States and the situation in the Gaza Strip on a global scale have resulted in some

* PhD Candidate at the Institute of Ethnology, Georg-August University of Goettingen. Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Brawijaya University. Email: iway.s@ub.ac.id.

changes in human's experience and the experience changes with it.

A new form of the experience creates a demand for a change of views on the security concept in contemporary life. Some theorists conceptualize security from international relations, political science, and cultural studies perspectives; only few of them discuss it in an anthropological and sociological framework (Goldstein 2010).

Accordingly, by viewing a "relevance" spirit of the change, security was earlier seen as a construction of a relationship and discourse related to an individual's psychological feeling. In this situation, security concept still places the individual at the centre of discourse. The government, in the current situation, has changed the campaign of individual security to collective security, which is concerned with inter-state relations. This issue is specifically addressed to an understanding that security issues are no longer only the concern of the police and military, but also of civilians.

In this article, I briefly discuss local security, the emergence of traditional security, and belonging in the frame of regional autonomy and social changes of the Balinese after the enforcement of the Regional Autonomy Law. The article will show how regional security issues and the relations built by local actors are a form of collective interpretation of local autonomy. Therefore, regional autonomy is actually paradoxical in the Balinese specifically and in other regions in Indonesia generally. Autonomy, that is mainly created to generate equal distribution for the regions that have been left behind, has in fact influenced the social-cultural-political life of Indonesian society. This influence is in the form of varied interpretation of autonomy at the local scale. I focus on the trend of the emergence of traditional security in Bali with an emphasis on the analysis of local values. This trend is discussed primarily with relation to developments after the Bali Bombings in 2002.

Local autonomy can be interpreted as a right, authority and obligation granted to the autonomous regions to manage and

administer their own affairs and interests of local communities to improve local efficiency and effectiveness in governance in the context of the service to the community. The implementation of development is in accordance with statutory regulations. Meanwhile, an autonomous region is defined as a unified legal community which has territorial boundaries and is authorized to manage and regulate local government affairs and the interests of the local community based on the community's aspirations. When local autonomy (*otoda*) was first applied in 1999, a lot of people questioned whether there would be automatic changes in the fundamental and structural paradigm. Actual conditions in Indonesia have shown that local autonomy has generated some conflicts.

Conflicts of *otonomi daerah* (or *Otoda*) are frequently described in the literature concerning the seizure of local resources, local budgets and public policy (Seymour and Turner 2001) or economic perspectives (Alm. J *et al* 2001). The implementation of autonomy is currently marked by conflicts of confiscation among the local elites, central elites and local-entrant people or *krama tamiu*[1] (migrants). However, to date, few Indonesian academics have explored the symptoms of regional autonomy and local security in the framework of the politics of belonging. As an example, after the first Bali Bombing in 2001, which killed at least 203 civilians from Indonesia and abroad, according to my notes, at least two issues were promoted and developed as the main issues. The first emphasis was on the relationship between terrorism and the context of religious harmony (Hindu-Islam). The second was on economic issues, in which local society (which is predominantly Hindu) cannot compete with migrants (Islam) in the informal economic sector. However, I oppose the first idea that uses the terrorism issue as a part of propaganda in the conflict in contemporary Balinese. I propose that the symptoms

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[1] *Krama Tamiu* is a term generally used by the Balinese to describe newcomers other than the Balinese ethnic group.

in regional autonomy cases are the symptoms to customary claim the proprietorship of assets and culture as a whole, which had not been acknowledged by the New Order government under Soeharto's regime.

During the era of President Soeharto (1966-1998), the emergence of local components like *Pecalang*[2] was strongly suppressed under the control of the military. The local elites had no courage to dominantly grow within a society. Repressive action was considered a sign of military loyalty to the New Order regime under President Soeharto. Local elites in villages or tribal groups taught the concept of citizenship under the control of the state apparatus or central government. Local-scale governments were only a formality form of the state power over citizens. For these 32 years, local forces were neglected issues in the centralized system of government. As a result, after reformation in 1998, decentralization became a channel to express social resentment. The granting of regional autonomy was interpreted as local freedom to develop local rules respectively. Consequently, these local rules actually raised the action of local actors to establish ethnic boundaries. They attempted to promote this concept as part of regional autonomy as well as the rescue of local resources from outsiders (people from outside their ethnic group). One development in Bali has been the emergence of the local security issue, namely strengthening the position of traditional security in Balinese society referred to as *Pamswakarsa*.

The emergence of traditional security, called *Pecalang* in response to local security in Bali is a form of strategy and political negotiation between Balinese society and the country in response

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[2] *Pecalang are* often called traditional police in Bali, as their duty is to provide security for events such as religious ceremonies, cremation (*ngaben)*, marriage ceremony, and other ceremonies related to custom in Bali. In general, there is no difference between the duties of pecalang and common police like directing traffic around the location of the ceremony, and escorting the cremation procession to the graveyard. *Pecalang* are characterised by wearing Balinese traditional clothes including checked cloth with keris on the waist, *udeng* on the head, white shirt and often a vest with *PECALANG DESA ADAT* written on it.

to the autonomy. However, in contemporary political conditions, the existence of *pecalang* has begun to disturb the life of the Balinese, especially for the migrants that are mostly Moslem. I provide an illustration taken from an article about *Pecalang* published by the local newspaper *Bali Post.* In the period between 2002-2005, *Bali Post* published articles about violence in society involving *Pecalang* almost everyday. The violence occurred mostly as a result of theft and robbery, however it was perpetrated in the name of "security" of the island of Bali from the outsiders, who were considered to be disturbing the tranquility of the Balinese.

Politics of awareness is actually not new in Bali. The massacre of the members of Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia – PKI)* in 1965 showed how the pattern of vigilance was successfully established by outside forces as well as the power of the society itself. People panicked, as they did not know who their enemies were. They were suspicious of others, their neighbors and even their relatives. After that, with the military mobilization, the traditional security forces were provoked by the military to "clean up" the areas and conduct massacres against the people who were considered to be members or sympathizers of the PKI. Since then, even though under military control, the movement to anticipate and be wary of outsiders (or environment and groups considered to be external groups) became latent issues. Now, when violence occurred in the autonomy framework, it was signified as a justification on behalf of custom. I contend that regional autonomy is precisely an arena of political negotiation between local groups versus the state in understanding ownership and local assets.

In the following I will present a view of autonomy and then move to discuss how autonomy is connected to politics of belonging, and how politics of belonging is actually interpreted by local actors (elite groups). Finally I will link the understanding of the existence of *desa adat* and the issue of belonging in the autonomy framework and how it is used to develop *kebalian* identity.

Otoda as Local Autonomy

One of the fundamental questions in this discussion is the concept of how local autonomy or *otoda* is related to ethnicity. Local autonomy in Indonesia is very interesting because the issue has been associated with identity. Anderson (1983), in *Imagined Community*, states that the discourse about Indonesian nationality and identity is not yet complete. I agree with what Anderson proposed. Indonesia, with diverse ethnic conditions, has faced some obstacles in bringing the concept of *kesatuan* (unity) to build the character of the nation. What is meant by unity is still debated among social scientists and Indonesian intellectuals.

The form of government in Indonesia from 1945 until now has changed several times. Indonesia historically applied government systems - starting from parliamentary, presidential, federation, guided system – before applying again the presidential system which is used in the current government. During this period, the government has been searching for the best patterns to handle every problem associated with the dissatisfaction of local groups. Some rebellions were related to the people's dissatisfaction with the relationship between the central and local government. Indeed, there has been no sharp analysis of the data. Since the New Order government under President Soeharto, the study of ethnicity and nationality issues have become as if only related the government and military apparatus. However, together with the changing socio-political context in Indonesia in 1998, reformation, marked by the fall of Soeharto as a president, has brought some adjustments and reconsideration of the central-local relational forms that had been under the control of the state-military.

To talk about local autonomy, it is also necessary to appreciate the progress achieved by local areas and also the weaknesses involved in the social, economic and political processes. Local autonomy is factually paradox. On one side, the rate of economic growth became faster and equalization was more thorough. Significant growth can only be seen in the areas that have many

natural resources. On the other side, for those areas with few natural resources, local autonomy has become a new problem for the local government in managing the local administration and finances. Conflict of interest has become one of the facts frequently seen in the local autonomy problem. Local autonomy only clarifies the real picture of ethnicity and its problem in Indonesia in a smaller-scale society.

However, it does not mean that *otoda* is considered to open some other ethnicity and tribalism cases in Indonesia. Along with local autonomy, a new phenomenon has emerged in society at local level, that is local identity. Local identity arises when there is a local fanaticism, that is the emergence of the local people and other issues increasingly established in the social life of the society at a local level.

Local identity always appears in every development of the society when the people feel that they are part of a community, they have responsibilities in what has become part of the areas where they live or were born from generation to generation. Identity, like what has been proposed by Jenkins (2008), is a sense of belonging of a person to a particular group and part of the thinking, perception, feeling and attitude of a person that become requirements for the membership of the ethnic groups.

The discourse of local identity in the implementation of local government occurs in the people in charges of bureaucracy, reception staff and direct election. All of them have directly emerged issue of the true local people. These matters have strengthened the issue of local identity, particularly ethnic identity that emerges when there is a placement or seizure of resources in the implementation of local autonomy, especially in the areas where the community is heterogeneous.

Furthermore, Giddens (1991) explains that identity is formed by the ability to perpetuate the narration of the self, so that the continuous feeling of biographical continuity is established. It can be seen that identity is part of the symbols of personality in

every individual or group. From this theory, the role of identity can also be part of actions related to political action in promoting the interests of individuals or the members of one particular group because they have the same ethnic, race, religion and characteristics or regionalism.

In the case of Indonesia, one of the events that marks how local autonomy is considered as a door giving rise to local identity issues is migration. Migration can be detected as a movement of inhabitants from one place to another. Lee (1966) mentions that one of the factors that encourages someone to migrate is the decreasing livelihood and work opportunities in his place of origin, such as the decline of environmental supporting capacity, a decrease in the demand for certain goods for which the raw materials are hard to obtain like minerals, wood or agricultural crops. When *otoda* was implemented, some elite groups in local communities were very enthusiastic. However, now that several years have passed, the fears of some people like increasing levels of poverty are finally proven. The decision to implement local autonomy has driven some people to migrate to big cities or cities considered to provide greater opportunities to improve their economic circumstances. One of these areas is Bali, a small island close to the eastern tip of Java Island.

Tourism is a strong magnet which pulls people to migrate to Bali. However, there are two occurrences to bear in mind when looking at how Balinese people give different responses to local autonomy. The first occurrence is the Bali bombing. This tragedy has raised sensitive issues related to religious and cultural differences between the migrant and the non-migrant (the native Balinese) communities. The second is that local autonomy is considered to be an initiative to purify Balinese identity. The *Ajeg Bali* concept emerged as part of this attempted purification. My initial analysis shows that the purification of identity has a very narrow meaning. It was deliberately created by a group of Balinese scientists who consider that Balinese culture will fall apart. Their

point of view in general considers culture as something static and this has trapped them in addressing the fundamental problem in local autonomy and local security issues in Bali. The emergence of *pecalang* or traditional security force became legal after *Ajeg Bali* with the concept of *desa pekraman* was implemented with arbitrary actions towards the immigrants.

Examples of how to make decisions about belonging and decentralization (regional autonomy), based on the idea of owning a right of a cultural heritage, have emerged in Bali in recent years. I first describe the historical context of the origin of regional autonomy in general in Indonesia followed by the inception of "autonomy within autonomy" like what has happened in Bali.

Ajeg Bali and *Pecalang* in the Context of Social Movements

Regional autonomy in Indonesia is inseparable from the fall of the New Order regime under President Soeharto that ruled the country for 32 years in May 1998. The momentum began with the economic crisis that hit Southeast Asia in 1997, which led to the emergence of a no-confidence vote against governments, including in Indonesia. University students affiliated with the movement demonstrated for a week, which paralyzed Indonesian economic and political systems. After the fall of Soeharto, Indonesia entered a new era called reformation era. Part of the discourse at that time was changing the government system from a centralized system to a decentralized one. The outcome of this discourse is contained in the Law 22 and 25 of 1999, which were first implemented in 2001. Through this law, autonomy has spread throughout the Indonesian archipelago.

The implementation of the autonomy law was not based on good preparation and caused "shock" for the local governments. Local governments were given greater authority to manage their regions, from bureaucratic systems and administration to allocating financial budget and there was some panic about how to manage these areas. Consequently, local governments started to

formulate programs to best disburse their budgets ostensibly for the welfare of the people. However, the autonomy issue created problems politically and economically such as the increasing cases of corruption in the local governments (Lindsey and Dick 2002). Autonomy enabled the local government apparatus be corrupt. In other words, regional autonomy has led the emergence of local "small kings".

Nevertheless, in this article I will not consider the corruption issue in further detail. Although I believe it is important, my aim is to look at the social phenomenon related to the regional autonomy issue from an anthropological and sociological perspective. Therefore, I focus on the case of regional autonomy in Bali, translated by the inception of a social movement named *Ajeg Bali* through which the issue of local security has enabled the emergence of *pecalang* as a strong mass organization. Bali, with its cultural characteristics supported by customs, religions and cultures, is unique. In my opinion, the way local actors demonstrate their understanding of regional autonomy is, amongst others, in the form of a repressive system that has been embedded since the post-colonialism era and perpetuated by the New Order government. The form of "inheritance of memories" from colonialism and the New Order era is a great influential factor for the Balinese in understanding their identity.

Bali basically accedes to two administrative systems. The first is the official administration system (*desa dinas*) concerned with civic affairs and the second is the *desa adat* system that is concerned with social issues. Both systems are hitherto maintained. This is where the first Balinese identity lies; identity collectively built is the result of the actors' interpretation towards the combination between *desa dinas* and *desa adat*, each of which has relevance to national identity and locality. In the beginning of 2001, when regional autonomy was initially applied in all regions in Indonesia, Bali experienced the same problem of how to manage the autonomy. Both *desa dinas* and *desa adat* welcomed

the regional autonomy in their own ways. *Desa dinas* considered regional autonomy as a way to improve the rural development system, in the hope of getting an enormous budget for developing rural areas. Meanwhile, *desa adat* interpreted regional autonomy as a means to revitalize Balinese culture based on Hinduism.

Some groups of *desa adat* sought support from the biggest local newspaper in Bali, the *Bali Post*. *Bali Post* and some the intellectuals associated with the paper invented a new slogan called "*Ajeg Bali*" (literal translation "Bali should stand tall" or "Bali Erect"), meaning that Bali should have more self-confidence culturally including in the fields of politics and economics (Reuter 2009). As Reuter (2009) stated, "Ajeg Bali reflects a growing senses of disenfranchisement and concomitant desire for self-empowerment among Hindu Balinese". It means that the emerging movement is a response from some local elites in Balinese society against external threats. The external threats are translated as terrorism issues, security and urbanization from other islands. The tendency addressed by *ajeg Bali* is ethnic fundamentalism and attempts by local elites to mobilize resources in Bali for a particular purpose.

Securitization, Local Actors and Politics of Belonging

Security issues in Bali actually began long before the first terrorism attack on 12 October 2002. The boundary problem is crucial, determined both by factual boundaries like geographical borders and also cultural or social boundaries. Border security, so far, is controlled by a group of individuals in the government and is supported especially by the military. The security is not only the security based on feeling of secure from criminals, but also being secure from the disruption of economic, social and political activities. The use of the military in Indonesia since 1965 provides a picture of how strong the impression of militarism has been planted in this nation.

The use of the security discourse becomes very important when it involves issues that acknowledge that migration or mobility

can be seen as a form of coping mechanism and local government control towards the implementation of local autonomy. However, the security of migration in local autonomy studies is also related to the anxiety that identity conflict and migration will spread. The reaction to the use of traditional security to maintain safety in the local autonomy era can be seen as a form of structural anxiety. The process of defense mechanism construction in a community is a reaction towards structural anxiety (Bigo 2002; Beck 1992; Giddens 1991; Castells 1996). In this context, it can be understood that a framework of one country and mobility among local groups becomes very reasonable. However, actions to provide social, cultural and economic security by local government aims to give a feeling of security to society groups. Providing security is only related to groups that feel themselves to be within a circle of identity of the elite group in the government.

Migrant groups are the groups affected in the crisis between the discourses of local autonomy because they are groups who have contacts with traditional security and local rules that are deliberately formed to narrow their space. The space is really their fate and has become a debate in local autonomy, that is the debate between local identity with belonging and local security.

Analyzing the situation, according to Yuval-Davis (2006), should begin by distinguishing what is meant by belonging and politics of belonging. According to Yuval-Davis, differentiating between *belonging* and *politics of belonging* is crucial. Belonging is about emotional attachment. For example is the feeling of "home" and "secure". Belonging has become something natural and can be politicized. For example, in determining the feeling of security, feeling has shown with whom and what kind of people or groups someone feels secure. The natural process is very common because it relates to the identification of the group or individuals. In other words, belonging also assumes borders of belonging and distributes naturally between "we" and "they".

Politics of belonging consists of some projects specifically

aimed at building belonging on the basis of several ways to certain collectivity, which is at the same time are constructed and reproduced from belonging boundaries through some different kinds of basis, from phenotypical to social (Yuval-Davis 2006). The analysis becomes very important in understanding identity problem, nationalism and contemporary politics of belonging.

Migration and security are issues that have been considered paradox but interconnected. Migration has opened another study about ethnicity in a contemporary society. What is shown by the Balinese by showing structural anxiety of the elite group has become planted cultural anxiety. I prefer to use the term cultural anxiety because for me structural anxiety has become a social institution in society. One of the institutions is the emergence of the term *Ajeg Bali* (see image). It is crucial to understand that anxiety, alertness and the emergence of a social movement executed by traditional security organizations in Balinese society is a reflection that elites and local actors have structurally made the anxiety belong to everybody. Mobilization of the social movement is collectively done through mass media such as newspaper, television and radio. The mobilization has made local leaders a board of supervisors of the movement. Accordingly, the movement seems to be part of the movement of Balinese government.

A billboard of 'Ajeg Bali' in a roadside in Denpasar (photo Darma Putra).

The declaration by the Governor of Bali about *Ajeg Bali* shows that the leadership of local government has lost in the arena of struggle in the society. Emotion owned by the society becomes a structural game played by local elites because they have capability in mobilizing masses. Therefore, the collective anxiety of feeling secure and "home" turns to be an issue of local identity. Theoretically, local identity gives some clues that there is a building image of what is called Balinese, who the Balinese are, who we are, and who the migrants, the outsiders and "they". This project has shown a tendency to construct the differences between "we" and "they" in the local autonomy era.

Conclusion

I have argued that the issue of local autonomy is paradox. On one side, *otoda* emerged with the spirit to provide equality and justice for the society. On the other side, the project raises another problem by promoting the issue of local identity. Local autonomy is an arena between local elite groups and the interest of central-local government in seizing the belonging of cultural identity. Local autonomy is a form of symbolization of how identity and belonging adhere in the society. Politics of belonging is established to underline the territories and the boundaries socially, economically and politically.

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